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Abstract
Solving goals—like proving properties, deciding word problems or resolving constraints—is much easier with some presentations
of the underlying theory than with others. Typically, what have been called “completion processes”, in particular in the study of
equational logic, involve ﬁnding appropriate presentations of a given theory to more easily solve a given class of problems.
We provide a general proof-theoretic setting that relies directly on the fundamental concept of “good”, that is, normal-form,
proofs, itself deﬁned using well-founded orderings on proof objects. This foundational framework allows for abstract deﬁnitions of
canonical presentations and very general characterizations of saturation and redundancy criteria.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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One good deﬁnition is worth three theorems.
—Alfred Adler, “Mathematics and creativity” (The New Yorker, 1972)
1. Introduction
It is common, when deﬁning a theory axiomatically, to ask whether the chosen axioms—like Euclid’s axiom of
parallels—are independent. Dependent axioms are superﬂuous from the point of view of the theory (set of theorems),
so such redundancies can be removed without impacting the theory. One speaks then of independent sets of equations,
or of alternative presentations of algebras.
For formal, non-computational purposes, one often seeks small, elegant axiomatizations, but there are competing
measures of smallness—such as fewest axioms or minimal overall size, let alone of elegance.And there is no theoretical
reason to expect there to be a unique smallest way of presenting a theory. At the other extreme, the full deductively
closed theory is, of course, unique, but is almost invariably inﬁnite and unsuitable as a presentation. Our goal here is to
provide criteria for the identiﬁcation of ideal, canonical presentations, using more subtle preferences than mere size.
Mathematics also involves solving equations, or, more generally, sets of constraints. In such a context, one cares
about the form of formulæ. The process of solving transforms a deﬁning set for the problem into formulæ that are
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in solved form; see [15]. In Gaussian elimination, for example, one begins with a set of linear equalities involving
unknowns, and infers solved forms assigning numerical values to each unknown, or most general relations between
variables. This corresponds to the point of view that arithmetic is a cheap form of inference, while equation solving is
relatively hard. Thus, once one has derived a solved form, it is an easy matter to check whether other linear equalities
follow.
1.1. Good presentations
In these examples, as in many others, one is given an axiomatic presentation, and sets up a goal of inferring certain
formulæ: theorems in Euclidean geometry, in one case; solutions of equations, in the other. In both cases, some
presentations of the underlying theory are better suited for the task at hand than others. So, one needs to deﬁne the
“best” axiomatic presentation for any given problem-solving task. To that end, we compare presentations in terms of
the quality of proofs they allow. Our work is, therefore, based on a concept of “good” proofs and our goal is to ground
the theory of good proofs.
The archetypical instance of this paradigm consists in ﬁnding a rewriting-based decision procedure for the uniform
word problem in a given equational theory. In this context, the best proofs are rewrite (“valley”) proofs and the best
presentation is a terminating Church-Rosser (“convergent”) rewrite system (see [1,22,44]).
Good presentations, good proofs and good inferences are clearly related, but what is the best starting point for
developing an æsthetic, uniﬁed and useful understanding of them? We promote the thesis that the ideal starting point
is the concept of proof orderings. Proof quality is measured via a well-founded proof ordering on the set of all proofs:
the smaller in the ordering, the better.
1.2. Good proofs
Consider a naïve example: suppose we have an equational theory deﬁned by the axioms a = b and b = c. Then
a = b = c = b = c and a = b = c are both valid proofs of a = c, but, clearly, the second is better than the
ﬁrst, as it is shorter, and non-circuitous. More generally, in proof theory, one assigns ordinals to proofs and shows
that under certain circumstances there exists a “critical” subformula that can be replaced in a way that reduces the
ordinal of the proof. These proof-theoretical concepts have been extended to dynamically changing proof systems (see
[21]). Here we generalize the proof-ordering method, as used in term rewriting for establishing properties of rewrite-
system completion procedures [2], to an abstract setting of arbitrary proof systems, supplied with an arbitrary ordering
of proofs.
As a simple example of where these considerations are leading, imagine some axiom p(x). It would be quite natural
to consider it virtually cost-free to instantiate an axiom like this in an inference p(x) p(t), proving the “corollary”
p(t). So, were one to charge for axioms by their size, a generic subproof of the above form would be cheaper than
direct use of the corollary, p(t), for any big term t . Thus, for a good presentation, there would be no advantage in
including such trivial consequences of the axiom.
1.3. Good inferences
How can we tell a machine to go about ﬁnding good proofs? Much of the research in automated deduction consists
in ﬁnding the best inference system for ﬁnding the best proofs or best presentations. In addition to correctness and
completeness, two other notions are essential here: saturation and redundancy. Since the search spaces are in general
huge and their structure unknown a priori, one controls the application of locally deﬁned inference rules by applying
rules only up to saturation of the formula set (to insure termination) and up to redundancy (to reduce search). Thus, the
dominant point of view in the deduction community is to seek out good inferences and maintain control over them.
Completion processes have been devised in various different contexts, but in rather similar fashion. These include:
standard Knuth–Bendix completion [35], equational completion [29,39,31], completion in speciﬁc algebras (like order-
sorted ones [26]), inductionless induction (initiated by Musser; see [34]), ordered completion [36,4,28], completion
for semantic uniﬁcation [17,23], to mention a few. The formalization of the completion mechanism, as well as its
correctness and completeness, has been intensively studied, beginningwith the seminalwork ofHuet [30] and especially
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since the introduction of proof orderings in [3]. The universality of “completion” in automated deduction is further
evident in the syntheses of completion and Gröbner basis generation initiated by Bruno Buchberger [13], as in, for
example, [33].
Weprovide abstract deﬁnitions of saturation and redundancy that are applicable in these, andmany other, frameworks.
1.4. Canonical presentations
An interesting feature of the complete set of reductions produced by Knuth–Bendix completion [35] and the Gröbner
bases produced by Buchberger’s algorithm [11,12] is that they are unique, regardless of nondeterministic choices made
along the way [20,37]. In other words, “best presentations” are unique for a given ordering of proofs (usually built
from a given term ordering). Our abstract notions lead similarly to canonicity.
1.5. Overview
Since we aim to be foundational, starting from a very simple, abstract and universal setting, we deﬁne a number
of abstract properties of presentations, that is, of arbitrary sets of formulæ. Fixing inference and the ordering, we
characterize the unique canonical presentation for a theory in several ways:
(1) Lemmata that can appear as premises in minimal proofs (Deﬁnition 25);
(2) Smallest saturated set (Theorem 44);
(3) Simplest presentation (Theorem 55);
(4) Non-redundant formulæ (Corollary 62);
(5) Reduced saturated set (Proposition 63);
(6) Conclusions of trivial proofs (Corollary 69).
These characterization of the canonical presentation for a theory are boxed thus in the following sections.
A collateral contribution of this work is abstract formal deﬁnitions of redundancy, saturation, canonicity, complete-
ness, simplicity, and triviality, all of which are fundamental notions in the design, study and analysis of proof search
methods.
The next section deﬁnes the basics. Section 3 uses proof orderings to deﬁne the canonical presentation and Section 4
explains how to reduce presentations. Section 5 introduces the central concept of saturation. Redundancy and its
elimination are the subject of Section 6. By introducing a notion of subproof, Section 7 provides an additional, more
practical characterization of the canonical presentation. We conclude with a brief discussion of related and future
works.
2. Ordered proof systems
We begin with the following structure, which we call an ordered proof system, and which consists of the following
ﬁve components:
• Proofs P;
• Formulæ A;
• Premises Pm : P → 2A (provides the set of assumptions used by a proof p, usually denoted [p]Pm);
• Conclusion Cl : P → A (provides the formula in the conclusion of a proof p, usually denoted [p]Cl);
• Well-founded proof ordering  : P × P → 2.
The crucial point here is the proof ordering, which may be partial. As usual, we use > for ∩ =. We assume for
convenience that the proof ordering only compares proofs with the same conclusion (pq ⇒ [p]Cl = [q]Cl), rather
than mention this condition each time we have cause to compare proofs. (In Section 7, we explore the implications of
an additional subproof relation.)
As we develop a foundational framework, we do not need tomake any assumptions whatsoever as to the way formulæ
and proofs are described. Therefore, the formal system used to deﬁne the proofs could be inference-based (like for
equational logic [43] or the sequent calculus [25]), or grammar-based, or anything else. Of course, the syntax of all
proofs should not be confused with the description of “good” proofs. An inference-based description of the latter is the
subject [9].
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We will use the term presentation to mean a set of formulæ, and justiﬁcation to mean a set of proofs. We reserve the
term theory for the deductive closure of a presentation.
Example 1 (Ground resolution). Consider a propositional ordered binary resolution calculus: formulæ are ﬁnite sets
of literals; proofs are ﬁnite unordered unary-binary trees, with formulæ for leaves and literals labelling internal nodes.
Propositional constants are (arbitrarily) linearly ordered and proofs are compared using the corresponding recursive
path ordering [16].
On the concrete level, for a literal , ¯, its negation, and L,L′, clauses, a binary node  corresponds to the application
of binary resolution (called identical resolution in [24]), labelled by the name of the literal being resolved:
 ∨ L ¯ ∨ L′
L ∨ L′ ().
Then, given the presentation B = {a ∨ b¯, b ∨ c, a¯ ∨ c¯, a}, we have for example the following two proofs of b:
b ∨ c a¯ ∨ c¯
a¯ ∨ b (c) a
b
(a)
a a¯ ∨ c¯
c¯
(a)
b ∨ c
b
(c).
Comparing them, assuming the precedence a < b < c, we see that the ﬁrst is smaller:
c(a(a, a¯ ∨ c¯), b ∨ c) > a(c(b ∨ c, a¯ ∨ c¯), a).
We will now prove elementary results based on the ordered proof system notion.We start by extending the mappings
Pm and Cl to sets of proofs in the standard fashion:
Deﬁnition 2.
[P ]Pm != ⋃
p∈P
[p]Pm,
[P ]Cl != {[p]Cl:p ∈ P }.
Then trivially: [∅]Pm = [∅]Cl = ∅.
It follows immediately from the deﬁnitions that Pm and Cl are monotonic:
Lemma 3 (Monotonicity of Pm and Cl). For all justiﬁcations P and Q:
P ⊆ Q ⇒ [P ]Pm ⊆ [Q]Pm, (1)
P ⊆ Q ⇒ [P ]Cl ⊆ [Q]Cl. (2)
Deﬁnition 4 (Proofs). For all presentations A, the set of all proofs using some of the premises in A is deﬁned as
Pf (A) != {p ∈ P: [p]Pm ⊆ A}.
For a speciﬁc conclusion c ∈ A, we sometimes write
Pfc(A) != {p ∈ Pf (A): [p]Cl = c}.
Lemma 5. For all presentations A:
[Pf (A)]Pm ⊆ A.
Proof. We have [Pf (A)]Pm =⋃p∈Pf (A)[p]Pm ⊆ A by deﬁnition of Pf (A). 
It follows from these deﬁnitions that justiﬁcations are monotonic:
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Lemma 6 (Monotonicity of Pf ). For all presentations A and B and formulæ c:
A ⊆ B ⇒ Pfc(A) ⊆ Pfc(B),
A ⊆ B ⇒ Pf (A) ⊆ Pf (B).
Proof. Note that [p]Pm ⊆ A ⊆ B for all p ∈ Pf (A); thus p ∈ Pf (B). 
Lemma 7. For all justiﬁcations P :
P ⊆ Pf ([P ]Pm).
Proof. By monotonicity of Pm, we have p ∈ P ⇒ [p]Pm ⊆ [P ]Pm ⇒ p ∈ Pf ([P ]Pm). 
Remark 8. Because of Lemmata 5 and 7, presentations and justiﬁcations are related by the Galois connection formed
by Pf and Pm with respect to subset.
From the previous deﬁnitions, it is easy to see that proofs need only what they use, that is:
Lemma 9. For all presentations A,
Pf ([Pf (A)]Pm) = Pf (A).
Proof. By Lemma 5 and monotonicity of Pf , Pf ([Pf (A)]Pm) ⊆ Pf (A). By Lemma 7, Pf (A) ⊆ Pf ([Pf (A)]Pm). 
We can now deﬁne the notion of a “theory” generated by a presentation:
Deﬁnition 10 (Theories).
• The theory (or deductive closure) of a presentation A:
ThA != [Pf (A)]Cl. (3)
• A presentation A is a basis for a theory  if
ThA = .
• A presentation A is deductively closed if
ThA = A.
• Presentations A and B are equivalent if they allow exactly the same theorems:
A ≡ B !=ThA = ThB.
Deﬁnition 11 (Consequence). The consequence relation  has the following natural deﬁnition:
A  c
!= ∃p. [p]Pm = A ∧ [p]Cl = c.
This is extended to multiple conclusions as
A B
!= ∀c ∈ B. A  c.
Most of our results depend on the following standard properties of Tarskian consequence relations:
Postulate A (Reﬂexivity). For all formulæ a:
{a}  a.
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Postulate B (Closure). For all presentations A:
Th ThA ⊆ ThA.
We will assume that these postulates hold for all proof systems considered in this paper.
Useful basic properties of proof systems follow from these postulates.
Proposition 12 (Monotonicity). For all presentations A and B:
A ⊆ B ⇒ ThA ⊆ ThB.
Proof. This follows from monotonicity of Pf and Cl. 
Proposition 13 (Reﬂexivity). For all presentations A
A ⊆ ThA.
Proposition 14 (Transitivity). For all presentations A, B and C,
ThA ⊇ B ∧ ThB ⊇ C ⇒ ThA ⊇ C.
Proof. By Monotonicity we have Th ThA ⊇ ThB. By Closure we get ThA ⊇ Th ThA ⊇ ThB ⊇ C. 
A presentation and its theory contain the same information in the sense that they allow one to prove exactly the same
theorems:
Lemma 15. A presentation A and its theory ThA support exactly the same theorems:
ThA ≡ A.
Proof. For all presentations A, by Reﬂexivity, A ⊆ ThA, and by Monotonicity, ThA ⊆ Th ThA. Finally, Closure
allows one to conclude that Th ThA = ThA, or ThA ≡ A. 
Lemma 16. For all presentations A:
[Pf (A)]Pm = A.
Proof. We have one direction already in Lemma 5. For the other, consider any formula a in A. By the Reﬂexivity
Postulate, {a}  a. So there is a proof p ∈ Pf ({a}) ⊆ Pf (A) with premise and conclusion a. By monotonicity of Pm,
a ∈ [p]Pm ⊆ [Pf (A)]Pm, as required. 
Finally, we get that larger presentations mean larger justiﬁcations and vice-versa:
Lemma 17. For all presentations A and B:
A ⊆ B ⇔ Pf (A) ⊆ Pf (B), (4)
A = B ⇔ Pf (A) = Pf (B). (5)
Proof. We have one direction of (4) by monotonicity of Pf . Suppose a ∈ A. There is, by Reﬂexivity, a proof p ∈
Pfa(a) ⊆ Pfa(A) ⊆ Pfa(B) with a as both premise and conclusion. Hence, a ∈ B, yielding the other direction.
The second equivalence follows immediately. 
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3. Canonical presentations
Proof orderings allow for minimal proofs, central to our development of a theory of canonical inference. Recall that
by deﬁnition, q < p only holds for proofs p and q with the same conclusion. Of course there could be incomparable
proofs with the same conclusion.
Deﬁnition 18 (Minimal proofs). The minimal proofs in a justiﬁcation P are denoted as follows:
P
!={p ∈ P : ¬∃q ∈ P. q < p}.
Obviously, for all justiﬁcations P ,
P ⊆ P. (6)
Note that the notion of minimal proofs is not monotonic, as clearly P ⊆ Q does not in general imply that P ⊆ Q.
Well-foundedness of the proof ordering means that minimal proofs exist and sufﬁce:
Lemma 19. For all presentations A:
ThA = [Pf (A)]Cl.
Proof. Minimal proofs are proofs, i.e. Pf (A) ⊇ Pf (A) (by (6)). So by monotonicity of Cl, we get [Pf (A)]Cl
⊇ [Pf (A)]Cl.
Suppose p∈Pfc(A). Since  is well-founded, there exists a minimal q∈Pfc(A), qp. Hence c∈[Pf (A)]Cl. 
Deﬁnition 20 (Flattening). Those premises employed in minimal proofs are denoted
A
!= [Pf (A)]Pm.
Lemma 21. Flattening a presentation gives fewer formulæ:
A ⊆ A.
Proof. By monotonicity of Pm and Lemma 5, we get A = [Pf (A)]Pm ⊆ [Pf (A)]Pm ⊆ A. 
The following lemma is useful:
Lemma 22. Q ⊆ P ∧ P ⊆ Q ⇔ P = Q.
Proof. The right-to-left direction is easy (by (6)). For the other, suppose p ∈ P . By assumption, p ∈ Q. Consider
any q ∈ Q such that qp. By assumption, q is also in P . But p is minimal in P . Hence, p = q ∈ Q. 
Now that we know how to deﬁne good proofs, we can understand how much one can restrict a presentation without
jeopardizing the theory.
Deﬁnition 23 (Normal form proof ). A proof p is in normal form if it belongs to the set of minimal proofs that allow
the use of all theorems as lemmata: p ∈ Pf (ThA).
Normal form proofs are denoted as follows:
Nf (A) != Pf (ThA).
Considering only normal-form proofs does not restrict the theory, as we have:
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Lemma 24.
ThA = [Nf (A)]Cl.
Proof. By deﬁnition ThA = [Pf (A)]Cl; applying this to ThA we get Th ThA = [Pf (ThA)]Cl. By Lemmata 15 and
19, we have
ThA = Th ThA = [Pf (ThA)]Cl = [Nf (A)]Cl. 
Our main deﬁnition is:
Deﬁnition 25 (Canonical presentation). The canonical presentation A of a presentation A is the ﬂattened theory
of A:
A
!= [ThA]
Inlining the previous deﬁnitions intimates that the canonical presentation contains those formulæ that appear as
premises of possible valid minimal proofs:
A = [ThA] = [Pf (ThA)]Pm = [Nf (A)]Pm. (7)
4. Reduced systems
In a classical way (cf. the Smyth [42] powerdomain construction), proof orderings can be lifted to sets of proofs as
follows:
Deﬁnition 26 (Better proof sets). Justiﬁcation Q is better than justiﬁcation P if:
P Q !≡ ∀p ∈ P. ∃q ∈ Q. pq.
Justiﬁcations are similar if:
P  Q !≡ P QP.
Proposition 27. Better () is a quasi-order.
It follows from the deﬁnitions that these relations are compatible: P  QR  S implies P  S.
Proposition 28. For all justiﬁcations P and Q:
P  P, (8)
P ⊆ Q ⇒ P Q, (9)
P Q ⇒ [P ]Cl ⊆ [Q]Cl, (10)
P Q ⇔ P  Q. (11)
Proof. Well-foundedness ensures that minimal proofs exist; therefore (8) holds.
Implication (9) holds trivially.
Line (10) holds since q < p only holds for proofs p, q with the same conclusion.
Suppose P Q. Trivially, P P ; by (8), Q Q; so P  Q. For the other direction of (11): P P
QQ. 
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Proposition 29. For all presentations A and B:
Pf (A)Pf (B) ⇒ ThA ⊆ ThB, (12)
A ⊆ B ⇒ Pf (A)Pf (B), (13)
B ⊆ A ∧ Pf (A)Pf (B) ⇒ A ≡ B. (14)
Proof. Line (12) is a consequence of (10); (13) is a consequence of the monotonicity of Pf ; (14) follows from the two
previous ones. 
Proposition 30. The relation  is a partial ordering on minimal proofs.
Proof. The relation is transitive (Proposition 27). Antisymmetry holds since, assuming P  Q P and p ∈ P ,
there must be a q ∈ Q and p′ ∈ P such that pqp′. Hence p′ = p = q. By symmetry, P = Q. 
Lemma 31. Minimal proofs use the premises of minimal proofs:
Pf (A) = Pf (A).
Proof. Suppose p ∈ Pfc(A) for some c. Then [p]Pm ⊆ A and p ∈ Pfc(A). Were there a q ∈ Pfc(A) ⊆ Pf (A)
such that q < p, p would not be minimal in Pf (A).
For the other direction, suppose p ∈ Pfc(A) ⊆ Pf (A), but p is not minimal in Pf (A). In other words, there is
some q ∈ Pfc(A) such that p > q. There must be some r ∈ Pfc(A) ⊆ Pf (A) such that qr . This contradicts the
minimality of p in Pf (A). 
A presentation A is said to be reduced (or ﬂat) if A = A.
Lemma 32. What is reduced cannot be further reduced:
A  = A.
Proof. Apply Pm to both sides of Lemma 31. 
Theorem 33. A reduced system can prove as much as the initial one:
A ≡ A.
Proof. By Lemmata 19 and 31,
ThA = [Pf (A)]Cl = [Pf (A)]Cl = [Pf (A)]Cl = [Pf (A)]Cl = ThA. 
Theorem 34. The sharpening function  is canonical with respect to the equivalence of presentations. That is
A ≡ A, (15)
A ≡ B ⇔ A = B, (16)
A = A. (17)
Proof. For (15), by Theorem 33 and Lemma 15, we get A = [ThA] ≡ ThA ≡ A.
For (16), suppose A ≡ B, that is, ThA = ThB. By substitution of equals in the deﬁnitions: A = (ThA)
= (ThB) = B.
Conversely, if A = B, by (15), A ≡ A = B ≡ B.
For (17), letting B be A in (16), A ≡ A iff A = A, and (15) gives the left side. 
Finally, by Lemma 32, we have (A) = (ThA) = (ThA) = A.
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Lemma 35. The canonical presentation A cannot be further reduced:
(A) = A. (18)
5. Saturated presentations
There are two manners in which a presentation can be said to sufﬁce for normal form proofs:
Deﬁnition 36 (Completeness). A presentation A is complete if every theorem has a normal form proof, that is, if
ThA ⊆ [Pf (A) ∩ Nf (A)]Cl,
or, equivalently,
ThA = [Pf (A) ∩ Nf (A)]Cl.
Deﬁnition 37 (Saturation). A presentation A is saturated—denoted Satur A—if it supports all possible normal form
proofs:
Nf (A) ⊆ Pf (A).
It follows from Lemma 22 that:
Lemma 38. A presentation A is saturated iff
Pf (A) = Nf (A).
A presentation is complete if it is saturated, but proving the converse (Proposition 43 below) requires an additional
hypothesis:
Deﬁnition 39. Minimal proofs are unique if for all A ⊆ A and c ∈ A it is the case that
|Pfc(A)|1.
Proposition 40. If minimal proofs are unique, then all of A is needed:
B A ⇒ ThB ThA
for all presentations A and B.
Proof. By Lemma 21 and monotonicity of Th :
B A ⊆ A ⇒ ThB ⊆ ThA.
Let a ∈ A \ B = [Pf (A \ B)]Pm. Then there is a p ∈ Pf (A) \ Pf (B), which, by uniqueness, has a conclusion
[p]Cl /∈ [Pf (B)]Cl = ThB. 
The following is useful:
Lemma 41. For all presentations A:
Pf (A) ∩ Nf (A) = Pf (A) ∩ Nf (A).
Proof. Since Pf (A) ⊆ Pf (A), we need only to show that Pf (A) ∩ Nf (A) ⊆ Pf (A). Suppose p ∈ Pf (A) \ Pf (A).
Then there is a q ∈ Pf (A) ⊆ Pf (A) ⊆ Pf (ThA) (by Reﬂexivity) such that p > q. But then p /∈ Pf (ThA)
= Nf (A). 
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Theorem 42. A presentation A is saturated iff it contains its own canonical presentation A:
SaturA ⇔ A ⊆ A.
Proof. As A ⊆ B ⇔ Nf (A) ⊆ Pf (B), and by the deﬁnition of saturated, we need to show that Pf (A) = Nf (A) iff
Nf (A) ⊆ Pf (A). ByReﬂexivity andmonotonicity ofPf :Pf (A) ⊆ Pf (ThA). So, for anyminimal proofp ∈ Pfc(A) ⊆
Pfc(ThA) there must be a q ∈ Pfc(ThA) = NfcA ⊆ Pfc(A) such that pq. By minimality, p = q ∈ Nf (A). In other
words, Pf (A) ⊆ Nf (A). So if Pf (A) = Nf (A), then, Nf (A) = Pf (A) ⊆ Pf (A).
Suppose now that Nf (A) ⊆ Pf (A). By Lemma 41:
Nf (A) ⊆ Pf (A) ⇔ Nf (A) = Nf (A) ∩ Pf (A) = Nf (A) ∩ Pf (A) ⇔ Nf (A) ⊆ Pf (A). 
When we enforce equality instead of the one-sided inclusion of the previous theorem, that is, when we consider pre-
sentations that are their own canonical presentation, we arrive at the concept of canonical presentations:A presentation
A is canonical if A = A.
Proposition 43. A presentation is complete if it is saturated. If minimal proofs are unique, then a presentation is
saturated iff it is complete.
Proof. If c ∈ ThA, then (by Lemma 24) there is a proof q ∈ Nf (A) of c. If A is saturated, then (by Theorem 42)
[q]Pm ⊆ [Nf (A)]Pm = A ⊆ A, and q ∈ (Pf (A) ∩ Nf (A)), as required for completeness.
For the other direction, by completeness and Lemma 41, for all c ∈ ThA, Pfc(A) ∩ NfcA = ∅. By uniqueness of
minimal proofs, |Pfc(A)|, |NfcA|1. Hence, A is saturated, with Pfc(A) = NfcA for all c. 
We can now state a second characterization of canonical presentations:
Theorem 44. The canonical presentation A is the smallest saturated set:
Satur A
A ≡ B ⇒ [SaturB ⇔ A ⊆ B]
Thus, the canonical presentation is minimal in the sense that no equivalent proper subset of A is saturated.
Corollary 45. If A is saturated, then every equivalent superset also is:
Satur A ∧ A ≡ B ∧ A ⊆ B ⇒ Satur B.
Example 46 (Ground resolution—continued). Consider again the resolution calculus: The canonical presentation for
A = {a∨ b¯, b∨c, a¯∨ c¯} includes, in addition, {b∨ a¯, a∨c, b¯∨ c¯}. The canonical basis of B = A∪{a} is just {a, b, c¯}.
The canonical basis of B ∪ {c} is the empty clause.
6. Redundancy
Formulæ that when removed from a presentation do not hurt proof quality will be termed “redundant”. The concept
of redundancy lies at the heart of efﬁcient theorem proving: one seeks to perform inferences on non-redundant formulæ
so as to avoid redundancy propagation, whose cost could be prohibitive.
The “better than” quasi-ordering on proofs is lifted to a “simpler than” quasi-ordering on (equivalent) sets of formulæ,
as follows:
Deﬁnition 47 (Simpler presentation). Presentation B is said to be simpler than an equivalent presentation A when B
provides better proofs than does A:
AB !≡ThA = ThB ∧ Pf (A)Pf (B).
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Presentations are similar if their proofs are:
A≈B !≡Pf (A)  Pf (B).
Reﬂexivity and transitivity are inherited from ≡ and . Therefore:
Proposition 48. The relation  is a quasi-ordering.
We get easily that:
Lemma 49.
A≈B ⇔ Pf (A) = Pf (B).
Lemma 50. Presentation A is saturated iff ThA≈A.
Proof. It is always the case that AThAA. If A is saturated, then A ⊇ A and, therefore, ThAAA. For the
other direction, suppose p ∈ Nf (A). Since A is similar, there must be a proof q ∈ Pf (A) ⊆ Pf (ThA), such that qp.
But q /<p, so p ∈ Pf (A). It follows that Nf (A) ⊆ Pf (A), and A is saturated. 
Proposition 51. For all presentations A and B:
A ⊆ B ∧ ThA = ThB ⇒ AB, (19)
A ⊆ B ∧ Pf (B)Pf (A) ⇒ A≈B. (20)
Proof. Line (19) is a consequence of (11) and the deﬁnitions. If A ⊆ B and Pf (B)Pf (A), as on the left of (20),
then Pf (A)  Pf (B), again by (11). Hence, their theories are the same, and, by deﬁnition, A≈B. 
Proposition 52. The relation  is a quasi-ordering and ≈ is its associated equivalence relation.
Lemma 53. For all presentations A, B and C:
C ⊆ B ∧ AA \ B ⇒ A≈A \ C.
Proof. We apply (20): We are given that Pf (A)Pf (A \ B) and, by monotonicity of Pf , we have Pf (A \ B)
Pf (A \ C). 
Canonical presentations are indeed simpler:
Proposition 54.
A ≈ A, (21)
A  A. (22)
Proof. To see that A≈A, note that, by Theorem 33, the two theories are equal. Thus, by Lemma 21 and (19), AA.
Applying Lemma 31 and Proposition 28, we get that AA, since
Pf (A) Pf (A) = Pf (A)Pf (A).
For the second claim: By Lemma 5,
A = [Pf (ThA)]Pm ⊆ [Pf (ThA)]Pm ⊆ ThA.
Thus,
Pf (A) ⊆ Pf (A) ⊆ Pf (ThA).
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Also, by Lemma 7,
Pf (ThA) ⊆ Pf ([Pf (ThA)]Pm) = Pf (A) ⊆ Pf (A).
By Lemma 22,
Pf (A) = Pf (ThA)
so
Pf (ThA) Pf (ThA) = Pf (A)Pf (A).
In other words, ThAA. By the Reﬂexivity Postulate and (11), we have AThA, so, by transitivity of  , we
are done. 
Theorem 55. A canonical presentation A is the simplest:
A ≡ B ⇒ B A
Deﬁnition 56 (Redundancy). A set R of formulæ is (globally) redundant with respect to a presentation A when
A ∪ R≈A \ R.
The set of all (individually) redundant formulæ of a given presentation A is denoted Red A:
Red A != {r ∈ A:A≈A \ {r}}.
Theorem 57. The set of individually redundant formulæ is globally redundant:
A≈A \ Red A.
Proof. Let A′ = A \ Red A ⊆ A. We show that Pf (A)Pf (A′) and conclude using (20). Consider some proof p1 ∈
Pfc(A) \ Pf (A′). Since there is a redundant r ∈ [p1]Pm ∩ Red A, there must be a proof p2 ∈ Pfc((A \ {r})) ⊆ Pf (A)
such that p1p2. But [p2]Pm = [p1]Pm, so p1 > p2. If p2 /∈ Pf (A′), then there would also be a p3 ∈ Pf (A), such that
p2 > p3. Since the proof ordering is well-founded, this cannot go on forever, so there is, in fact, a proof pn ∈ Pfc(A′)
such that p1pn. 
Theorem 58. Redundant formulæ are not needed:
A = A \ Red A.
Proof. If a /∈ A = [Pf (A)]Pm, then Pf (A)Pf (A \ {a}). Thus, AA \ {a} and a ∈ Red A.
On the other hand, let a ∈ A ⊆ A, that is, a ∈ [p]Pm for some p ∈ Pf (A). Suppose a ∈ Red A, in other words,
AA′ = A \ {a}. So, there must be a proof qp such that [q]Pm ⊆ A′. Since, then, q = p, we have q < p. Hence,
p /∈ Pf (A), a contradiction. Thus, a /∈ Red A. 
It follows from Lemma 38 that
Corollary 59. Similar presentations are either both saturated or neither is.
For any two justiﬁcations P ⊆ Q, it is always the case that P ∩ Q ⊆ P . So:
Lemma 60. For any presentation A:
Pf (A) ∩ Pf (ThA) ⊆ Pf (A), (23)
Pf (A) ∩ Pf (ThA) = Pf (A) ∩ Pf (ThA). (24)
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Hence:
Lemma 61. Similar presentations are either both complete or neither is.
Proof. If A≈B, then, by deﬁnition, ThB = ThA, and, by Lemma 49, Pf (A) = Pf (B). So, if A is complete,
we get:
ThB = ThA = [Pf (A) ∩ Nf (A)]Cl = [Pf (A) ∩ Nf (A)]Cl
= [Pf (B) ∩ Nf (B)]Cl = [Pf (B) ∩ Nf (B)]Cl. 
Corollary 62. The canonical presentation A is the theory without redundancies:
A = ThA \ Red ThA
Red A = ∅
Lemma 57 is another corollary.
Proposition 63.
A presentation is canonical iff it is saturated and reduced.
Proof. One direction follows immediately fromTheorem44 andCorollary 62. For the other direction, letA be saturated
and reduced. We aim to show that A = A. By Proposition 54, AA and the two presentations are equivalent. If A
is saturated, then by Theorem 42, A ⊇ A. By (19), for any r ∈ A \ A, AAA \ {r}. But Red A = ∅, since A is
reduced, so it cannot be that r ∈ A. In other words, A \ A = ∅, and A is canonical. 
7. Subproofs
In the operational quest for the best proofs, a fundamental step is to perform localized searches for bad subproofs,
which could stand improvement. To that end, we now impose additional structure on proofs: a well-founded subproof
(partial) order . We extend this notation to sets of proofs:
P Q != ∀q ∈ Q. ∃p ∈ P. p q
and use  for its reﬂexive closure.
Deﬁnition 64 (Subproofs). We also use the following notation for the set of all subproofs:
P
!= {p ∈ P: ∃q ∈ P. q p}.
Deﬁnition 65. A proof is deemed trivial when its conclusion depends only on itself, that is, if [p]Pm = {[p]Cl}, and it
is its own only subproof.
We denote by â such a trivial proof of a ∈ A and by Â, the set of trivial proofs of each a ∈ A.
We will hereinafter assume three things about subproofs:
Postulate C (Trivia). Assumptions are subproofs:
p [̂p]Pm
for all proofs p.
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Postulate D (Subproof ). Subproofs use a subset of the assumptions:
p q ⇒ [p]Pm ⊇ [q]Pm
for all proofs p and q.
Most signiﬁcantly,
Postulate E (Replacement). Decreasing a subproof, decreases the whole proof:
p q > q ′ ⇒ ∃p′ ∈ Pf ([p]Pm ∪ [q ′]Pm). p > p′ q ′
for all proofs p, q and q ′.
Note that this postulate is weaker than the cut rule
A B B  c
A  c
in that it only guarantees a proof of A  c when the proofs of A B are smaller than the trivial subproofs B̂ appearing
in the proofs of B  c.
As a consequence of Triviality, every formula admits a trivial proof:
Proposition 66. Every formula c has a trivial proof ĉ ∈ Pf ({c}).
Proof. By the Reﬂexivity Postulate, there is a proof p of c such that [p]Pm = {c}. By Triviality, p ĉ. 
As a consequence of Replacement, all subproofs of minimal proofs are minimal:
Proposition 67. For all presentations A,
Pf (A) = Pf (A).
Theorem 68. Minimal trivial proofs are irredundant:
A = [Pf (A) ∩ Â]Cl
for all presentations A.
Proof. Suppose a ∈ A. Then, there is, by the Trivia Postulate, some proof p ∈ Pf (A), such that p â. Were â not
minimal, then by the Replacement Postulate, neither would p be minimal. So, Â ⊆ Pf (A). Clearly Â ⊆ Â. Hence,
A = [Â]Cl ⊆ [Pf (A) ∩ Â]Cl.
For the other direction, suppose c ∈ [Pf (A) ∩ Â]Cl. Then
c ∈ [Pf (A) ∩ Â]Pm ⊆ [Pf (A)]Pm = A. 
Substituting the deﬁnition of A:
Corollary 69. The canonical presentation A is the set of conclusions of all trivial normal-form proofs:
A = [Nf (A) ∩ T̂hA]Cl
Â = Nf (A) ∩ T̂hA
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8. Discussion
We have designed an abstract framework for canonical reasoning without assuming anything about the context other
than the existence of a well-founded ordering of entities named “proofs”. We have striven to attain the highest degree
of abstraction possible—yet derive nontrivial result—by maximizing the potential of a fruitful deﬁnition of “good
proofs”.
We have suggested that proof orderings, rather than formula orderings, take center stage in theorem proving with
contraction (simpliﬁcation and deletion of formulæ). Given a proof ordering that distinguishes “good proofs” from
“bad proofs”, it makes sense to deﬁne completeness of a set of formulæ as the claim that all theorems enjoy a smallest
(“best”, “normal form”) proof. Then, an inference system is complete if it has the ability to generate all formulæ
needed for such ideal proofs. Abstract conditions for inference of complete and saturated presentations, based on
the deﬁnitions herein, as well as example applications, such as paramodulation and ground completion, are explored
in [9] and [46].
Both saturation and redundancy have been deﬁned in terms of the proof ordering. This appears to be ﬂexible, since it
allows small proofs to use large assumptions. Given a formula ordering, one can, of course, choose to compare proofs
by simply comparing the multiset of their assumptions. The deﬁnition of redundancy in [5], namely, that an inference
is redundant if its conclusion can be inferred from smaller formulæ, coincides with ours when proofs are measured
ﬁrst by their maximal assumption. Our deﬁnition accords with the one given by Bonacina and Hsiang [10, Deﬁnition
3.3]—a sentence is redundant if adding it to the set of assumptions does not decrease any minimal proof. (See [8,
Chapter 2].)
The concept of saturation in theorem proving, in which superﬂuous deductions are not necessary for completeness,
was suggested by Rusinowitch [40, pp. 99–100] in the context of a Horn-clause resolution calculus. In our terminology:
A presentation was said to be saturated when all inferrible formulæ are syntactically subsumed by formulæ in the
presentation. (See also [41].) This concept was reﬁned by Bachmair and Ganzinger [5,6] and Nieuwenhuis and Rubio
[38, pp. 29–42]. These more recent works deem a set saturated if every possible inference is redundant, but use the
more general notions of redundancy.
Finally, it bears mentioning that, thanks to the Curry-deBruijn-Howard morphism, one can view a proof p as a term
whose type is precisely its conclusion [p]Cl. Considering proof orderings would then be related to the deﬁnition of a
suitable ordering on higher-order terms, as studied, for example, in [32], or, for dependently typed terms, in [14,7,45].
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